Evaluating Explanations for Stagnation

In this paper, we evaluate four explanations for economic stagnation that have been proposed in the literature: coordination failures, ineffective mix of occupational choices, insufficient human capital accumulation, and politico-economic considerations. We calibrate models that embody these explanations in the context of the stagnant economies of sub-Saharan Africa. The methodology of calibration is ideally suited for this evaluation, given the paucity of high-quality data, the high degree of model nonlinearity, and the need for conducting counterfactual policy experiments. In addition to studying how closely and robustly these models capture the African situation, we examine the quantitative aspects of their policy implications. We find that calibrations that yield multiple equilibria -- one prosperity and the other stagnation -- are not particularly robust. This tempers optimism about the efficacy of one-shot or temporary development policies suggested by models with multiplicity. However, the calibrated models indicate that small policy interventions are sufficient to trigger development in stagnant economies.Coordination failure, Occupational choice, Human capital accumulation, Political economy, Economic Development, Calibration.

Higher Education Subsidies and Heterogeneity, A Dynamic Analysis

In this paper, we develop a simple dynamic general equilibrium framework that can be used to study issues in higher education policy. The model features heterogeneity in income of parents and academic ability of students. Liquidity constraints create persistence in educational attainment even when ability is independently distributed. A unique steady state with a positive fraction of college educated workers, or one with a development trap, or multiple steady states which feature both of these, can result in equilibrium. We add a government that is equipped with a simple tax scheme and calibrate the model to the US economy to get a benchmark for our policy analysis. The government can design a tax and subsidy scheme that guarantees equality of opportunity, but only at the expense of a decrease in the efficiency of utilization of education resources; the welfare gain is minimal. A policy that aims to maximize the fraction of college-educated labor, by sending as many children as possible to college, results in a big drop in the above-mentioned efficiency with little or no welfare gain. If the government has the political will to use any available signal on ability and provide merit-based aid, it can increase this efficiency with little decrease in welfare. Education subsidies may be a potent tool for countries that are caught in a development trap; a sufficient level of subsidy can cause the economy to emerge from the trap.Dynamic General Equilibrium, Education, College Subsidies

Education Policies to Revive a Stagnant Economy: The Case of Sub- Saharan Africa

In this paper, we argue that the condition of education and the economy of the low performing sub-Saharan African countries can be characterized as a stagnant steady state -- a "trap". We present a simple heterogeneous-agent model in which high costs of education relative to income and the skill premium can cause the economy to be trapped in such a steady state with minimal educational attainment. We calibrate the model to available data from the sub-Saharan African countries to study policies that could potentially free these trapped economies and set them on a path to a higher steady state. We find that a tax and subsidy scheme that redistributes resources at the trap from poor households with lower ability children to those with higher ability children can pry the economy out of the trap, thus freeing it from dependence on foreign aid in order to achieve the same goal. In addition to the direct cost, a portion of the indirect cost also needs to be subsidized. Moreover, such a policy outperforms the abolition of child labor and the institution and enforcement of compulsory education laws when expenditure neutral welfare comparisons are made.Dynamic heterogeneous-agent models, Economic stagnation, Education subsidies, Calibration of a trap

The Farm, the City and the Emergence of Social Security

In this paper we study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries make it clear that urbanization and industrialization are strongly associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe a model economy in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together. We study an economy with two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city (industrial). The decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Furthermore, the level of social security is determined by majority voting. We show that a calibrated version of this economy is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States. Initially a majority of voters live on the farm and do not want to implement social security. Once a majority of the voters move to the city, the median voter prefers a positive social security tax. In the model social security emerges and is sustained over time as a political and economic equilibrium. Modeling the political economy of social security within a model of structural change leads to a rich economic environment in which the median voter is identified by both age and location

Does the progressivity of taxes matter for economic growth?

A sizeable literature has argued that the growth effects of changes in flat rate taxes are small. In this paper, we investigate the relatively unexplored area of the growth effect of changes in the tax structure, in particular, in the progressivity of taxes. Considering such a tax reform seems empirically more relevant than considering changes in flat tax rates. We construct a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth in which there is heterogeneity in income and in the tax rates. We limit heterogeneity to two types, skilled and unskilled, and posit that the probability of staying or becoming skilled in the subsequent period depends positively on expenses on "teacher" time. In the production sector, we consider two sources of growth. In the first, growth arises as a purely external effect on account of production activities of skilled workers. In the second, a portion of the skilled workforce is used to work in research and other productivity enhancing activities and is compensated for it. Our analysis shows that changes in the progressivity of tax rates can have positive growth effects even in situations where changes in flat rate taxes have no effect. Experiments on a calibrated model indicate that the quantitative effects of moving to a flat rate system are economically significant. The assumption made about the engine of growth has an important effect on the impact of a change in progressivity. Quantitatively, welfare is unambiguously higher in a flat rate system when comparisons are made across balanced growth equilibria; however, when the costs of transition to the higher growth equilibrium is taken into account only the currently rich slightly prefer the flat rate system.Taxation ; Economic development

The Farm, the City, and the Emergence of Social Security

In this paper we study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries make it clear that urbanization and industrialization are strongly associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe a model economy in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together. We study an economy with two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city (industrial). The decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Furthermore, the level of social security is determined by majority voting. We show that a calibrated version of this economy is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States. Initially a majority of voters live on the farm and do not want to implement social security. Once a majority of the voters move to the city, the median voter prefers a positive social security tax. In the model social security emerges and is sustained over time as a political and economic equilibrium. Modeling the political economy of social security within a model of structural change leads to a rich economic environment in which the median voter is identified by both age and location.social security, political economy, structural change, migration

The Farm, the City, and the Emergence of Social Security

During the period from 1880 to 1950, publicly managed retirement security programs became an important part of the social fabric in most advanced economies. In this paper we study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. We describe a model economy in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together. We study an economy with two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city (industrial). The decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Furthermore, the level of social security is determined by majority voting. We show that a calibrated version of this economy is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States. Initially a majority of voters live on the farm and do not want to implement social security. Once a majority of the voters move to the city, the median voter prefers a positive social security tax, and social security emerges.